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Abstract. Anonymity systems are of paramount and growing importance in com-
munication networks. They rely on users to cooperate to the realisation of an
effective anonymity service. Yet, existing systems are marred by the action of
‘selfish’ free-loaders, so that several cooperation incentives are being proposed.
We propose a game-theoretic model of incentives in anonymity networks based
on parametric utility functions, which make it flexible, adaptable and realistic. We
then use the framework to analyse the cost of cooperation and the performance
of the gold-star incentive scheme in the Crowds protocol.
1 Introduction
Anonymity of electronic communication is rapidly becoming an essential requirement
of today’s society, in particular as far as tracking web browsing and handheld, mobile
devices is concerned. Its importance is increasingly recognised as crucial in many fields
of computer-supported human activities, such as e-commerce, web surfing, consumer
profiling, personalised advertising. Anonymity is needed both by individuals and or-
ganisations who want to keep their identities, interests and activities confidential. Cryp-
tographic techniques, firewalls, VPNs, and similar, can only provide partial protection;
indeed, they can only protect the contents of a communication, not its origin, destination
and occurrence. This constitutes a problem because in general a lot of potentially sen-
sitive information can be inferred by the mere presence of a communication between
two parties. To address this issue, many anonymity systems and protocols have been
proposed in the literature. Their purpose is to support anonymous communications, at
least to some extent [6, 22, 11, 21]. Since public visibility is the default condition on
today’s main networks, most notably the Internet, anonymity cannot be enforced by
either senders of receivers, but must be created by using messages to hide messages.
In fact, the consumers of the anonymity service are at the same time its providers, as
they cooperate to generate the network activity that grants anonymity to the system as a
whole. Typically, cooperation entails relaying other users’ messages in order to create
sufficient ‘doubt’ as to whom the real message originator actually is.
⋆ Partly supported by the European Union Seventh Framework Programme under grant agree-
ment no. 295261 (MEALS), the INRIA Large Scale Initiative CAPPRIS (Collaborative Action
for the Protection of Privacy Rights in Information Society) and the project ANR-11-IS02-
0002 LOCALI.
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Anonymity systems have a broad range of users, ranging from ordinary citizens
who want to avoid being profiled for targeted advertisements, to companies trying to
hide information from their competitors, to entities requiring untraceable communica-
tion over the Internet. With these many potential users, it would seem that anonymity
services based on consumer/provider users will naturally be well-resourced and able
to operate efficiently. However, cooperation cannot be taken for granted. Just because
functioning as a relay may cost a significant amount of processing power and band-
width, not all the users are going to be cooperative. Some will indeed act selfishly, and
only use the system to send their messages whilst ignoring the requests to forward oth-
ers’ messages. Obviously, with not enough cooperative users, the systems will hardly
operate at all, and will certainly not be able to afford adequate anonymity guarantees.
Observe that this is not a trivial problem as it may appear superficially. In fact, as part
of the anonymity requirements which lay at their very core, these systems do not mon-
itor their users’ behaviours nor their identities, making it virtually impossible to detect
selfish users. In other words, even without considering the several documented attacks
against anonymity networks (cf. e.g., [15, 19, 20]), inducing users to cooperate to the
anonymity mechanisms is among the most critical aspects of maintaining the secu-
rity and viability of the network. Due to the demand for strong anonymity from large
numbers of cooperative users, it is therefore vital that these systems are able to deploy
‘incentives’ to encourage users’ cooperation and so make the anonymity provision ef-
fective. Some interesting approaches to achieve that have been proposed, such as make
running relays easier and provide better forwarding performance [23].
To evaluate whether these approaches are effective, we need a framework which em-
powers us to analyse them, as well as provide guidelines and some mechanism design
principles for incentive schemes. This much we provide in the present paper, exploiting
notions and techniques from Game Theory.
Game theory [12] concerns strategic decision-making by rational entities – referred
to as players – who behave according to a given set of rules – the game – with the
explicit purpose of maximising their own benefit. Benefits are expressed by utility func-
tions, whose value is determined by the players’ actions and, ultimately, by their deci-
sions. The ‘rationality’ hypothesis is very significant, meaning that players are always
capable to choose their actions exactly as required to maximise their utilities. Game
theory is an excellent tool to model anonymity networks. In such systems users com-
pete for anonymity services in the way prescribed by specific protocols and, in doing
so, they invest their own resources. At the core of their participation in the system is
therefore a need to balance their gain in terms of security (viz., the level of anonymity
guaranteed to them) and/or performance (viz., the speed at which their transactions are
processed) against their costs (e.g., in terms of bandwidth, software, etc). Rationality
here is reflected in the micro-economic mechanisms which underpin such cost/benefit
decisions.
In this paper we build a game-theoretic framework to study incentive mechanisms
in anonymity systems. We model user behaviours (viz., cooperative or selfish) as a
non-cooperative game, and compute the equilibrium strategies for the users involved
in the game. As games model systems, we rely on game-theoretic principles to predict
whether the users will or will not be cooperative, i.e., under exactly what conditions
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they will participate in the system or just exploit it. We also use the game theoretic
notion of Nash Equilibrium and Dominant Equilibrium to analyse the strategic choices
made by different users. Our objective is achieved by considering a rich and flexible set
of parameters for users’ payoffs, including aspects such as anonymity, cost and perfor-
mance. In general, a user’s utility function Ui( ) in our framework is a sum of factor
functions Φk( ), each representing on a given payoff relevant to the analysis at hand.
Furthermore, such functions can be weighed differently for each individual user, so as
to afford great flexibility to the model.
In the paper we apply this framework to a relative simple anonymity scenario: the
C protocol. We show that, if we consider anonymity as the only parameter of
importance, then there is exactly one Nash (dominant) equilibrium, whose equilibrium
strategy is to behave cooperatively. Whilst this may explain why in standard C
there are no incentives to cooperation, it fails to match the real-world experience that
users can indeed behave uncooperatively. In fact, the picture changes radically as soon
as we consider the cost of communication as a parameter: as cost is a potent dissuader,
users will soon start to contemplate the opportunities of selfishness. We observe that
users who constantly behave selfishly enjoy no anonymity at all: as they only forward
their own messages, there can be no ambiguity whatsoever as to the origin of a mes-
sage intercepted from one of them. Strategic users will therefore engineer complex
strategies whereby cooperative and selfish phases alternate. This leads us straight to our
framework of mixed-strategy games, in which we study – both through analysis and
simulations – the collective equilibrium behaviour of strategic users. We furthermore
focus on the impact on equilibria of environmental parameters such as the number of
attackers, the volume of network traffic, etc, and investigate the mechanics they induce
on the equilibrium points.
We anticipate that the full power of our model only comes to the forefront when
incentive mechanisms are involved: the ability to analyse the dynamics of the users’
chosen behaviours – viz., the equilibrium strategies – as contextual parameters vary,
make the model suitable to design and analyse incentive mechanisms. To exemplify
this, we focus on the gold-star incentive mechanism [23], whereby cooperative users are
rewarded for their behaviour by enhanced performance, in the form of quicker delivery
time for their anonymous messages. Precisely, messages carrying a gold-star are routed
with priority over other messages. Users gain ‘gold-star’ status, i.e., the ability to send
gold-star messages, according to whether they “achieved a satisfactory performance for
at least R times out of the last V measurements.” We conduct for gold-star-incentivised
C the same set of analyses we carried out for C. In particular, we study
the equilibrium strategies as typical parameters vary, and illustrate how at equilibrium a
strategic user will be selfish at most with frequency 1− R/V . In other terms, our results
confirm the effectiveness of the gold-star mechanism as an incentive to cooperation.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first application of game-theory to yield
an applicable framework to model incentives in anonymity systems. We compare our
approach with the existing literature in §6 and assess it in the concluding section §7.
Structure of the paper: §2 and §3 introduce the framework from its game-theoretic
foundations. In §4 we present our analysis of C, and in §5 that of C ex-
tended with the gold-star mechanism.
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2 Game-Theoretic Incentive Framework
2.1 Strategies and equilibriums
In anonymity networks, honest users compete for anonymity services with limited re-
sources, such as bandwidth from servers. We model honest users’ behaviours in such
networks as a non-cooperative game. Each player (user) is a rational agent trying to
maximise her own utility and choosing her actions (e.g., cooperative, selfish, etc) strate-
gically. The actions she chooses are so-called strategies; the players’ chosen strategies
are drawn from a (finite) set of actions, and determine their utilities. A dominant strat-
egy for a player is a strategy which guarantees her an optimal utility irrespective of the
strategies chosen by the other players. It is thus natural for a player to adopt a dominant
strategy, if any such strategy exists. A game reaches a dominant-strategy equilibrium if
each player has a dominant strategy. However this may not be possible, since in gen-
eral a user’s utility depends not only on her own strategy, but may be affected by other
players’ strategies. In such cases, one typically considers a weaker property called Nash
Equilibrium (NE), which represents a strategy profile in which each player’s utility is
optimal, given that the other players also play their optimal strategies. We remark that
if a dominant strategy equilibrium exists, then at least one Nash Equilibrium does.
2.2 The general model in anonymity systems
We consider an anonymity system of n members {1, . . . , n} where nh users are honest
and the other nm (= n − nh) are malicious. Each honest member i has a finite set of
strategic actions Acti and we write S i and Ui for respectively user i’s strategies and
utilities. Here the Ui depends on several factors which we discuss below. Typically, the
set of strategic actions for user i include actions C and S, respectively for cooperative
and selfish. In this paper, we are only interested in these two actions, thus the set Acti
is independent of i. For every user, we then denote Acti simply as Act = {C, S}. Here
we define C as the behaviour of forwarding messages for any requests and S as the
behaviour of always refusing others’ requests but only forwarding one’s own messages.
User i will be called cooperative or selfish user according to whether S i = C or S i = S.
Note that cooperative and selfish actions refer to the behaviour of honest users: in the
paper, we make the standard assumption that malicious users always act cooperatively
in order to be chosen on the honest users’ paths and, so, to de-anonymise the system.
We leave to future work the investigation of the case where attackers may act selfishly.
Definition 1. A game Γ with nh players over anonymity systems of n members consists
of a set of utility functions U1, . . . ,Unh , where Ui;Act
nh → R, the set of real numbers.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , nh}, the utility function Ui(S 1, · · · , S nh ) describes the payoff
to user i under each combination of strategies. We assume that the utility functions
take the form of a linear combination of factor functions Φk( ), each accounting for a
parameter k relevant to the specific application. That is, using ρik ≥ 0 to indicate the
(relative) weight that user i attributes to parameter k, then
∑
k ρik = 1 and
Ui( ) =
∑
k
ρik ·Φk( ) (1)
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In the paper we will only use the factors of anonymity, performance and cost. The
former quantifies the value a user attaches to their anonymity, whilst the second to
the speed of their network activity. These parameters often need to be traded off against
each other, as a higher anonymity level often requires more complex protocols which, as
a side effect, reflect in longer delivery times. The ability to give them different weights
in the same utility function allows i to select their individual strategy to finely balance
their payoffs. Similarly, the ‘cost’ factor measures the importance that i attaches to any
payments she incurs for using the anonymity network. We believe these three factors
are the most important ones, and as such are sufficient to cover several significant ap-
plications, as in this paper; yet, additional factors can easily be included as required.
As honest users will in general vary their behaviour, and not always act according
to a fixed strategy S i, we shall use probabilities to describe the likelihood of i choosing
each possible strategy. More precisely, in our context we assume that with probability
xi (resp. 1 − xi), user i will act cooperatively (resp. selfishly). Such randomness yields
a so called mixed strategy. A mixed strategy is said pure if xi = 0 or xi = 1, i.e., when i
in fact never varies her strategy.
Let X = [0, 1]nh be the set of all possible combinations of nh honest users’ mixed
strategies. Given a combination of mixed strategies x = (x1, · · · , xnh ) ∈ X, we denote by
x−i the combination (x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xnh ) of nh − 1 mixed strategies obtained
from it by removing i’s, and, for a mixed strategy y, we let define
(x−i; y) , (x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, y, xi+1, · · · , xnh ),
which differs from x as user i switches from strategy xi to y.
Since a user action is determined by its mixed strategy xi, we rewrite his utility Ui
as a function from X to R and define the notion of equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2. For Γ a game, a mixed strategy z is a ‘best response’ for user i to x−i if
Ui(x−i; z) ≥ Ui(x−i; y) for all mixed strategies y.
A combination of strategies x = (x1, · · · , xnh ) ∈ X is a mixed Nash equilibrium if xi is a
best response to x−i, for i = 1, . . . , nh; the equilibrium is called a pure Nash Equilibrium
if every xi in x is a pure strategy.
Observe that definition above the just formalises the idea that no user can improve their
own utility by unilaterally deviating from the mixed strategy combination x.
Following [12], we compute the Nash equilibrium by studying the players’ best-
response correspondences. From Definition 2, i’s utility maximisation problem is
max
xi∈[0,1]
Ui(x−i; xi).
3 C
For the reader’s convenience, we report a detailed description of the C proto-
col [24]. In this section, we succinctly recall the fundamental mechanism of the proto-
col, and the related notion of probable innocence. We opt for the algorithmic descrip-
tion below, where aSend(M,D) represents the anonymous send of a message M to a
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destination D provided by C, M −→ D a standard communication, and {M}κ a link-
encryption via a shared symmetric key κ, of which there exists one for each pair of
participants in the protocol. The forwarding probability p f is (together with n) the key
parameter, as it determines the average length of the forwarding paths.
function aSend(M,D)
begin
j:= Random Pick({1, . . . , n})
{ Relay(M,D)}κ j −→ j
end
function Relay(M,D)
begin
if(Flip biased coin(p f))
M −→ D
else
j:= Random Pick({1, . . . , n})
{ Relay(M,D)}κ j −→ j
endif
end
Replies, if any, travel the path in reverse to reach the initiator. This is realised in the obvious way,
whereby j sends any reply back to the user she received the corresponding Relaymessage from.
Reiter and Rubin have proposed in [24] a hierarchy of anonymity notions in the
context of C. These range from ‘absolute privacy,’ where the attacker cannot
perceive the presence of an actual communication, to ‘provably exposed,’ where the at-
tacker can prove a sender-and-receiver relationship. Clearly, as most protocols used in
practice, C cannot ensure absolute privacy in presence of attackers or corrupted
users, but can only provide weaker notions of anonymity. In particular, in [24] the au-
thors propose an anonymity notion called probable innocence and prove that, under
some conditions on the protocol parameters, C ensures the probable innocence
property to the originator. Informally, they define it as follows:
A sender is probably innocent if, from the attacker’s point of view, she
appears no more likely to be the originator than to not be the originator.
(2)
Since anonymity only makes sense for honest users, we define the set of anonymous
events as A = {a1, a2, . . . , anh }, where ai indicates that user i is the initiator of the
message.
We assume that attackers will always deliver a request to forward immediately to
the end server, since forwarding it any further cannot help them learn anything more
about the identity of the originator. Thus in any given path, there is at most one detected
user: the first honest member to forward the message to a corrupt user. Therefore we
define the set of observable events as O = {o1, o2, . . . , onh }, where o j indicates that user
j forwarded a message to a corrupt user. In this case we also say that j is detected by
the attacker. Halpern and O’Neill in [13] formalised condition (2) mathematically as:
P(ai | o j) ≤
1
2
for all i, j. (3)
Also, it was proved in [24] as one of the fundamental properties of the framework that,
under the assumption that each honest user is equally likely to initiate a transaction
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(which we adopt in this paper too), probable innocence (2) holds if and only if
n ≥
p f
p f − 1/2
(
nm + 1
)
and p f ≥
1
2
(4)
We remark that the concept of probable innocence was recently generalised in [14]
to encompass the frequent situations where attackers have extra knowledge on users.
The idea formalised in [14] is that the gain obtained by the attacker by observing an
event must be relative to the knowledge that the attacker has of the users independently
of that acquired through the protocol (whence the attribute ‘extra’). The authors express
the extra information in terms of a random variable S with observable values s1 . . . sℓ,
and the conditional probabilities p(sk | ai). Probable innocence in presence of extra in-
formation can then be expressed by the condition:
P(ai | o j, sk) ≤
1
2
for all i, j, k. (5)
4 Cooperation Analysis in C
We now specialise our general game model to the setting of C. Our assumptions
identify a tractable yet realistic case for us to analyse how different utility factors affect
the users’ cooperation behaviour.
Honest users. In C, paths are static, and each user creates only one path per time
period. At the end of the period, all existing paths are destroyed, and a new session
starts where each user creates a new path for her anonymous communications. The
reason for that is that dynamic paths tend to decrease the overall system anonymity.
Therefore, we assume that honest users play the following mixed strategies game: (1)
at the beginning of each session, each player i chooses her strategy by flipping a coin
governed by her mixed strategy xi, and then acts accordingly for the entire session;
3
(2) selfish users will only cooperate to route their own messages. Observe that this is
a reasonable assumption in C, since messages are received in cleartext, and can
therefore be recognised by their originators.
Attackers. As stated earlier, attackers will always cooperate. Moreover, we assume they
do not originate messages, as they focus on de-anonymising the system.4 Finally, we
assume that in their attempt to guess the identity of the initiator, the attackers always
bet on the previous user on the path, the so-called detected user, because the latter is the
most likely initiator (cf. Proposition 4). That is why we measure the anonymity degree
of i against such attackers via the popular metric P(ai | oi), as expressed in (3) above.
4.1 The Anonymity Analysis
Since the purpose of joining an anonymity system is to enjoy anonymous communica-
tions, the anonymity payoff is typically a very important factor for honest users. Each
3 We plan to investigate in future work the case when users may flip their behaviour at each
interaction, by resorting to more advanced notions from game theory.
4 We leave to future work the case where attackers may flood part of the network to break some
users’ anonymity or to perform DOS attacks; for recent work related see, e.g., [10, 4, 25].
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cooperative user contributes to provide anonymity to all users, including herself. We
first focus on how cooperation affects the overall anonymity of the system, and then
investigate the anonymity payoffs of individual users.
During the creation of a path initiated by user i, both i and the malicious users will
forward i’s message with probability 1, while a generic honest user j will do so with
probability x j. Thus, i has on average ηi users to pick from for a path, where
ηi = 1 +
∑
j,i
x j + nm,
and ζi = ηi−nm of these are honest. We can then prove that Reiter and Rubin’s condition
(3) to ensure probable innocence to the initiator i becomes as follows.
Proposition 1. Let xi be the average cooperation probability of users other than i, viz.,
(
∑
j,i x j)/(nh − 1), and assume p f > 1/2 and that i is cooperative, i.e., xi = 1. Then, i
has probable innocence against nm malicious users if and only if
n ≥
p f + (1 − xi)/2xi
p f − 1/2
(nm + 1).
Proposition 1 can be proved similarly to condition (4), with respect to which it
expresses a more stringent constraint on n: indeed, as the honest users may behave
less cooperatively, there more users are required in the system altogether to guarantee
probable innocence against the same number of malicious users.
4.2 Measuring anonymity payoffs
Let Ai( ) denote i’s anonymity payoff function, whose value can be computed using the
anonymity degree metric P(ai | o j), as a function of the honest users’ mixed strategies.
Since the lower the anonymity degree, the better the anonymity guaranteed, we define
Ai( ) to be
(
1 − P(ai | o j)
)
a, where the parameter a can be used to normalise the value
of a ‘unit’ of anonymity and a ≥ 0. Let us start by evaluating the probability P(o j | ai),
for which we obtain the following result.5
Proposition 2. P
(
o j | ai
)
=

nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
i = j
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
x j i , j
Note that P
(
o j | ai
)
does not depend on xi, that when i is the initiator, the probability
of detecting user j is not influenced by i’s strategy. This is because that no matter what
strategy i chooses, she will forward her own messages with probability 1.
Now, let us compute the probability of detecting a user P(o j). Assuming a uniform
distribution for anonymous events ai, the following results hold.
Proposition 3. P(o j) =
1
nh
(
nm
η j
+
nmp f
η j(η j − ζ jp f )
+
∑
k, j
nmx jp f
ηk(ηk − ζkp f )
)
.
5 Due to space limitations, the proofs of Prop. 2 and 3 are omitted. We refer the reader to [28].
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Proposition 4. P
(
ai | o j
)
can be expressed as P
(
o j | ai
)
P
(
ai
)
/P
(
o j
)
from Proposition 2
and 3.
It is easy to show that P
(
ai | oi
)
is a decreasing function of xi and that, in particular,
P
(
ai | oi
)
= 1 when xi = 0. Therefore, a fully selfish user has zero anonymity degree.
Corollary 1.
∂P
(
ai | oi
)
∂xi
≤ 0.
Since Ai( ) is a decreasing function of P
(
ai | oi
)
, we have
∂Ai(x)
∂xi
≥ 0 . There-
fore, when anonymity is the sole value taken into account, cooperation is the dominant
strategy in C. Why is then the case that in the real world users often opt for the
selfish behaviour? In the following sections, we shall explain this apparent mismatch
by investigating the impact on users’ behaviour of cost factor.
4.3 The Cost Analysis
To fulfill the forwarding demands of C, user i incurs a cost Ci( ) and which can
be evaluated as
Ci( ) = Ci0 +
∑
j≤nh
Ci j,
where Ci0 is a fixed cost. i.e., incurred whether or not i is involved in any communica-
tion, and Ci j is the cost incurred for forwarding messages from j.
In the C protocol, the expected length of a path is
E(L) =
p f
1 − p f
+ 2.
Each path starts with the initiator while the last node is occupied either by a honest user
or by an attacker. The path’s internal nodes can only be honest users, because once a
malicious user is encountered, the previous user is detected and the path terminated.
The expected number of internal nodes is E(L) − 2. We can then evaluate the average
number of times i appears on her own paths as
1 +
E(L) − 2
ζi
+
1
ηi
= 1 +
p f /(1 − p f )
ζi
+
1
ηi
. (6)
Similarly, the average number of times i appears on other users’ paths is:
p f · xi/(1 − p f )
ζ j
+
1 · xi
η j
.
Let us now define τi as i’s network traffic, i.e., the number of the messages sent by
i, and c as the cost of forwarding each single one of them. Assuming that all users will
incur the same cost c, we can compute the cost of forwarding by summing up the two
cost components above and Ci0.
Proposition 5. Ci(x) = Ci0 +
(
1 +
p f /(1−p f )
ζi
+ 1
ηi
)
τic +
∑
j,i
(
p f ·xi/(1−p f )
ζ j
+
1·xi
η j
)
τ jc
10 Mu Yang, Vladimiro Sassone, and Sardaouna Hamadou
An immediate consequence is that the xi derivative of cost is greater than zero.
Corollary 2.
∂Ci(x)
∂xi
=
∑
j,i
( p f
1−p f
(1+
∑
k,i, j xk)
ζ j
2 +
1+nm+
∑
k,i, j xk
η j2
)
τ jc ≥ 0 .
Clearly, an increase in cooperation level will result in an increase in cost. Thus, if only
the cost factor is considered, the dominant strategy in C is to behave selfishly.
4.4 Balancing between Cost and Anonymity in C
In this section, we apply our game-theoretic model to the C protocol when users
considers both cost and anonymity factors at the same time. We substitute the cost
and anonymity from Propositions 4 and 5 in our utility function, and assume that the
normalisation factor a and c are such to put both utility factors on a same scale.
Ui( ) = −ρiC
[
Ci0 +
(
1 +
p f /(1 − p f )
ζi
+
1
ηi
)
τic +
∑
j,i
( p f · xi/(1 − p f )
ζ j
+
xi
η j
)
τ jc
]
+ρiA

1 −
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
+
∑
k,i
nmxip f
ηk(ηk − ζkp f )

a .
(7)
Differently from the cases of the anonymity and cost utilities, to find the equilib-
rium points for Ui( ) appears to be hard, although we know that there always exists in
mixed strategies games. Therefore, in order to illustrate the effect on a user’s utility of
the combination of the two factors, we resort to simulation techniques, focussing on rel-
evant parameters such as, the user strategy xi, her choice of factor weights ρiC , and the
number of the attackers in the system. The results are illustrated and discussed below.
In the following simulation, we consider nh = 100, p f = 0.8, c = 0.1, Ci0 = 5
and a = 100. We assume that the cooperation level for users other than i is uniformly
distributed and in the range of [0, 1].
Factors’ weights. We first show how the weights of the anonymity and cost factors
influence i’s strategies. Figure 1 shows Ui( ) as a function of i’ strategy xi, when the
weight attributed to cost varies from 0 to 1. Figure 1b represents the projection of Fig-
ure 1a’s surface onto the xi axis, for eleven selected values of ρiC (from 0 to 1 in 1/10
steps); for each such projection π, Figure 1c plots the value of xi which maximises π,
which attempts to visualise the process of choosing the strategy for i.
Observe that as ρiC increases from 0 to 1, the equilibrium points xi decreases: a bias
towards anonymity leads to a higher cooperation level for user i.
Number of malicious users. We perform a similar analysis as above (but due to lack of
space, in the rest of the paper we omit the figures). This confirms that more malicious
users result in smaller utilities for i, as i’s anonymity payoffs decrease substantially. In
particular, when nm is equal to 10 and 40 respectively, the maximum utility occurs at
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(a) i’s utilities when xi varies. (b) Detailed figure of Fig. 1a. (c) i’s equilibrium points: xi.
Fig. 1: Ui( ) as xi and ρiC vary; (nm = 10, τ = 50).
xi = 0.5, and xi = 0.68 respectively. The values of xi on equilibrium points are in the
range of [0.4, 0.7]. Thus the number of malicious users in the system has a minor impact
in encouraging or dissuading honest users to behave cooperatively.
Light traffic vs heavy traffic. Regarding the influence of network traffic, in our simu-
lations as the number τ of messages increases from 5 to 80, the utility Ui( ) decreases
considerably, as i incurs a heftier cost. The impact on the value of xi at the equilibrium
points is also significant, covering the interval [0.35, 1]. Thus, light traffic encourages
the honest users to behave cooperatively more often, whilst heavy traffic pushes them
towards selfishness.
Cooperation levels of the honest users other than user i. Here we let xi, the average
cooperation level of the users other than i, vary from 0 to 1. We find that when the
average xi is small, i will tend to behave selfishly to gain more payoff. When instead
xi increases, the values of xi on equilibrium points increase as well. Thus cooperative
behaviour of the honest users encourages more cooperative behaviour.
In conclusion, we see that when a user, interested in both anonymity and cost, wants
to optimise her utility, she needs to adapt her level of cooperation constantly, as the net-
work topology (e.g., the number of cooperating users and attackers), the traffic level and
her own choice of weight factor vary. As cost tend to be a very tangible a value, we can
reasonably conclude that it will be a prominent factor for most users. It is therefore very
important for anonymity systems to contemplate incentives mechanisms designed to of-
fer tangible benefits to cooperative users. The next section is dedicated to the analysis
of the effectiveness of one such mechanism.
5 Adding Incentives: the Analysis of Gold-star Mechanism
The gold-star mechanism was introduced in Tor [23] to encourage users to act as coop-
erative relays, and thus enhance the service performance for well-behaved forwarders.
We now turn to the gold-star incentive mechanism [23] in C. A request from a
user carrying a ‘gold star’ is given higher priority by other users, i.e., it is always relayed
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ahead of other traffic. The assignment of gold-star status, in the context of C, is
ruled by the policy “to have satisfactory cooperation for R times out of the last V mea-
surements.” In accordance with our game in the setting of C, defined in §4, we
assume a measurement is made in each session, and therefore a user obtain a gold-star
status if and only if she cooperated in R sessions out of the last V sessions. Let r = R/V
be the above ratio. Then a user i will be awarded the gold-star if xi is greater than or
equal to r. We assume that each cooperative user will give priority to gold-star mes-
sages even if she is not a gold-star user. There exist mechanisms in the literature to
allow anonymous users to accurately and securely report their interactions with their
neighbours, whose description in beyond the scope of this paper. Such mechanism will
help enforce the gold-star mechanism. Finally, as in its original proposal [23], we as-
sume that the gold-star status are publicly known.
5.1 The Anonymity Analysis with Gold-star Mechanism
In presence of gold-star mechanism, attackers have an extra information about the ini-
tiator due the fact that gold-star status are public. Therefore, we use the anonymity
metric encompassing extra knowledge via the conditional probability P(ai | o j, sl), as
expressed in (5). Here sl ∈ {s1, s2}, where l = 1 when the message is a gold-star one,
and l = 2 otherwise.
The correlation between a message status and its initiator, that is the probability
P(sl | ai) is as follows.
P
(
s1 | ai
)
=

1 xi ≥ r,
0 xi < r,
P
(
s2 | ai
)
=

0 xi ≥ r,
1 xi < r,
(8)
Now since for each initiator O and S are independent, from [14], we have
P(ai | o j, sl) = P
(
ai | o j
) P(sl | ai)
P
(
sl | o j
) .
If all honest users are equally likely to initiate a transaction, the probability P(ai | o j, sl)
can be rewritten as follows.
Proposition 6.
P(ai | o j, s1) =

P
(
o j | ai
)
∑
xk≥r
P
(
o j | ak
) xi ≥ r,
0 xi < r,
P(ai | o j, s2) =

0 xi ≥ r,
P
(
o j | ai
)
∑
xk<r P
(
o j | ak
) xi < r,
Now we can prove that the presence of gold-star mechanism reduces the anonymity
level of the network. The following indeed holds.
Corollary 3. P(ai | o j, sl) ≥ P(ai | o j).
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We define GS as the set of users j who have gold-star, i.e., x j ≥ r, and GS
c as the
complement set of those who do not, x j < r. If user i is the only element in either set,
then there is no anonymity guaranteed for i, given malicious users are on the path.
We again define the anonymity payoffs as Ai( ) =
(
1−P(ai | oi, sl)
)
a, the anonymity
payoffs for unincentivised C and gold-star C are respectively evaluated as
Proposition 7. – Unincentivised C (cf. Proposition 4):
Ai( ) =

1 −
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
+
∑
k,i
nmxip f
ηk(ηk − ζkp f )

a
– Gold-star C:
Ai( ) =

1 −
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
+
∑
k,i,k∈φ(i)
nmxip f
ηk(ηk − ζkp f )

a
where φ(i) = GS if i ∈ GS, φ(i) = GS c otherwise.
For the unincentivised C, since
∂Ai( )
∂xi
≥ 0, behaving cooperatively will bring
i maximum anonymity payoffs. However in gold-star C, Ai( ) also depends on
the number of users in the set which i belongs to. More users in such set leads to better
anonymity provided for i. When C starts out with a small number of gold star
relays, i has to behave selfishly more often in order not to be rewarded gold-star, and
hence gains more anonymity payoffs.
Ai( ) is an increasing function depending on xi in the following two ranges:
– if 0 ≤ xi < r, then
∂Ai( )
∂xi
≥ 0;
– if r ≤ xi ≤ 1, then
∂Ai( )
∂xi
≥ 0.
We observe that Ai( ) is a discontinuous function, with a discontinuity at xi = r.
Thus maximum points in the two ranges above occur at the extremes, xi = r, and
xi = 1, respectively, and the equilibrium behaviour of i will ultimately depend on which
of these is larger. If Ai(x−i; r) ≥ Ai(x−i; 1), then i will behave according to xi = r to
reach the tipping point and gain the gold-star. If instead Ai(x−i; r) ≤ Ai(x−i; 1), then the
dominant strategy for i is cooperative.
5.2 The Performance Analysis
Wewill use Pi(x−i; 1) and Pi(x−i; 0) to denote i’s performance payoffs when she behaves
cooperative or selfish, respectively. Thus, the expected performance payoff for i can be
evaluated as
Pi( ) = Pi(x−i; xi) = xiPi(x−i; 1) + (1 − xi)Pi(x−i; 0) (9)
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Following [23], the factor Pi here is interpreted as forwarding time Ti: the shorter
the forwarding time, the better the system performance. Thus we assume Pi( ) =
(
−Ti
)
p
where p represents the benefit of each unit of performance.
For the reader’s convenience, we summarise here the notation and names we shall
be using in the analysis in the rest of the section.
b: the size of messages sent by initiators;
f C
j
: the number of messages waiting at position j in the forwarding path, when the
forwarder at j has strategy cooperative ;
f C−S
j
: as above, but excepting the messages sent by selfish users;
nri: the number of forwarders on the path i initiated;
Q: the bandwidth of each user. Here we assume each user has the same bandwidth.
The total forwarding time Ti for user i is equal to the sum of the forwarding times
of all nri + 1 nodes in user i’s path. We start by evaluating the expected forwarding time
for cooperative users. The first relay is i herself and the forwarding time t1 is
t1 =
b( fC
1
+ 1)
Q
. (10)
The forwarding time of cooperative users at position jth can be computed the same as
Eq. 10. The cooperative users appear in the path with the probability p( j,C) = 1 in that
selfish users will not forward the messages initiated by the users other than themselves,
thus
t j = t j(C) p( j,C) =
b( fC
j
+ 1)
Q
× 1.
Given that the total forwarding time Ti is equal to t1 +
∑nri+1
j=2
t j, we can express
the performance payoffs of cooperative users as follows, where we denote by ∅ the
‘no-incentive’ mechanism
P∅i(x−i; 1) = −
(
t1 +
nri+1∑
j=2
t j
)
· p = −
[
b( fC
1
+ 1)
Q
+
nri+1∑
j=2
b( fC
j
+ 1)
Q
]
p (11)
The payoff function of the selfish user strategy can be evaluated along similar lines;
the resulting formula is shown in (12).
P∅i(x−i; 0) = −
( b
Q
+
nri∑
j=2
(ζi − 1
ζi
b( fC
j
+ 1)
Q
+
1
ζi
b
Q
)
+
ηi − 1
ηi
b( fC
j
+ 1)
Q
+
1
ηi
b
Q
)
p(12)
We now turn to the gold-star incentive mechanism [23] in C. The develop-
ment is similar to that in the above computations. The messages marked with a gold
star, sent by cooperative users, have higher priority. There are then b fC−S
j
KB rather
than b fC
j
KB before i’s requests at the jth position of the path. Let ⋆ denote the gold-
star mechanism, we then evaluate P⋆i(x−i; 1) as
P⋆i(x−i; 1) = −
(
t1 +
nri+1∑
j=2
t j
)
p = −
nri+1∑
j=1
b( fC−S
j
+ 1)
Q
p (13)
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The performance payoff of selfish strategy is shown below in Eq. (14).
P⋆i(x−i; 0) = −
(
b
Q
+
nri∑
j=2
(
ζi − 1
ζi
b fC
j
+ b
Q
+
1
ζi
b
Q
)
+
ηi − 1
ηi
b fC
j
+ b
Q
+
1
ηi
b
Q
)
p (14)
Since the utility Pi( ) of a fixed user depends on factors that may change very often
at different forwarding paths, we instead consider the average payoffs Pi(x−i; 1) and
Pi(x−i; 0) of cooperative and selfish users, respectively for each forwarding path. We
define fC (resp. fC−S) as the average number of messages (resp. gold-star messages)
waiting for a cooperative user. We also define the average nri as nr.
According to Eq. (9), we have the performance payoffs for i in unincentivised
C and gold-star C as
Proposition 8.
P∅i(x−i; xi) = −
bp fCxi
Q
(
nr(1 −
ζi − 1
ζi
) +
ζi − 1
ζi
+
1
ηi
)
−
bp
Q
(
nr + 1 + fC
(
(nr − 1)(ζi − 1)
ζi
+
ηi − 1
ηi
))
P⋆i(x−i; xi) =
bpxi
Q
(
fC
( (nr − 1)(ζi − 1)
ζi
+
ηi − 1
ηi
)
− fC−S(nr + 1)
)
−
bp
Q
(
nr + 1 + fC
(
(nr − 1)(ζi − 1)
ζi
+
ηi − 1
ηi
))
Let α define the ratio fC−S/ fC. It actually represents the percentage of users who
have gold star among the all honest users, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 in that if α is relatively small, then
it reflects not many users are rewarded the gold-star. Then we study the xi derivative of
the performance payoffs, we have
Proposition 9. – Unincentivised C
∂P∅i(x−i; xi)
∂xi
≤ 0
– Gold-star C: if α ≤
nr − 1
nr + 1
ζi − 1
ζi
+
1
nr + 1
ηi − 1
ηi
holds, then
∂P⋆i(x−i; xi)
∂xi
≥ 0 .
5.3 Balancing between Performance and Anonymity
By applying our game-theoretic model to the gold-star C, we consider anonymity
and performance factors in this section. We substitute the anonymity and performance
payoff equations Proposition 7 and 8 to our utility function, we obtain:
16 Mu Yang, Vladimiro Sassone, and Sardaouna Hamadou
– Unincentivised C:
Ui( ) = ρiA

1 −
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
+
∑
k,i
nmxip f
ηk(ηk − ζkp f )

a
+ρiP
(
−
bp fCxi
Q
(
nr(1 −
ζi − 1
ζi
) +
ζi − 1
ζi
+
1
ηi
)
−
bp
Q
(
nr + 1 + fC
( (nr − 1)(ζi − 1)
ζi
+
ηi − 1
ηi
)))
– Gold-star C:
Ui( ) = ρiA

1 −
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
nm
ηi
+
nmp f
ηi(ηi − ζip f )
+
∑
k,i,k∈φ
nmxip f
ηk(ηk − ζkp f )

a
+ρiP
(
bpxi
Q
(
fC
( (nr − 1)(ζi − 1)
ζi
+
ηi − 1
ηi
)
− fC−S(nr + 1)
)
−
bp
Q
(
nr + 1 + fC
( (nr − 1)(ζi − 1)
ζi
+
ηi − 1
ηi
)))
where φ(i) = GS if i ∈ GS, φ(i) = GS c otherwise.
From the above equations, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 10. In gold-star C, if α ≤
nr − 1
nr + 1
ζi − 1
ζi
+
1
nr + 1
ηi − 1
ηi
holds, then
∂Ui( )
∂xi
≥ 0 when xi ∈ [0, r);
∂Ui( )
∂xi
≥ 0 when xi ∈ [r, 1],
and function Ui( ) is discontinuous at the point xi = r.
We run simulations to illustrate the equilibrium points of i strategies in different
situations. We consider nh = 100, nr = 3, b = 100, Q = 500, a = 100 and p = 1. We
assume the cooperation level for users j other than i is uniformly distributed and in the
range of [0, 1]. We start with the case of unincentivised C.
Factors’ weights. As we did in §4.4, we first show how the weights of the anonymity
and performance factors influence i’s strategies. In our simulations, as the weight at-
tributed to performance varies from 0 to 1, Ui( ) varies as a function of i’s strategy xi.
As ρiP keeps increasing from 0 to 1, the equilibrium points xi decrease. Higher weight
towards anonymity factor leads to higher cooperation level of user i.
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Number of malicious users. More malicious users result in smaller anonymity but
greater performance payoffs for i. In particular, when nm varies from 2 and 80, the values
of xi on equilibrium points are in the range of [0.2, 0.43]. Thus the number of malicious
users has a minor impact in encouraging or dissuading cooperation behaviours of honest
users.
Light traffic vs heavy traffic. In our simulations, as the average number fC of messages
waiting at the forwarders increases from 0 to 10, the utility Ui( ) decreases, so that
i incurs more delivery time. The values of xi on equilibrium points decrease as well,
from 1 to 0.18. Thus, like before, light traffic encourages more frequent cooperation by
honest users, while heavy traffic suggests them selfishness.
Cooperation levels of the honest users other than user i. Regarding the influence of
users’ behaviours, we find that when the average x j is small, i will be willing to behave
cooperatively more often to gain more payoff. When x j increases, the values of xi on
equilibrium points decrease until 0.37. Thus, cooperative behaviours of the honest users
other than i do not encourage more cooperative behaviours of i.
Moving to analyse Gold-star C, we consider the following parameter settings:
ρiP = 0.5, nm = 10, fC = 3, fC−S = (1 − r) fC in our simulations. When r varies as 0.8,
0.7 and 0.6 respectively, the equilibrium points for i are xi = 0.8, xi = 0.7 and x = 1,
respectively. They are better than those in unincentivised C.
Note that the first two xi of equilibrium points are exactly the values of rule r. We
find that before xi increases to r, both the anonymity and performance payoffs increase
as xi increases. Then, when xi exceeds r, the performance payoff increases further,
whilst the anonymity payoff depends on the number of gold-star users. In this simula-
tion, when i gets the gold-star, the anonymity payoff of i is smaller than that when i
has not. This is because, since x j is uniformly distributed and r = 0.8, the number of
gold-star users is smaller than the number of users without gold-star. Thus by balancing
with performance payoffs, i chooses her strategy as xi = r. The third xi is 1, because
from r to 1 the performance payoff keeps increasing while the the anonymity payoff
increases as well. On the point xi = 1, the balanced payoffs (Ui = 38.9139) of perfor-
mance and anonymity have exceed the previous maximum payoffs (Ui( ) = 34.6699)
where xi = 0.6.
We do simulations by varying nm, fC, and find the shapes of the lines are the same
as those of the above simulations. Therefore, as we proved in Proposition 10, i’s strategy
depends on the comparison of Ui( ) on xi = r and xi = 1.
6 Related Work
The anonymity systems and protocols are typically based on a suitable infrastructure
for forwarding messages. For instance, the C protocol [24] requires a set of users
or peers willing to route each others’ requests. In other cases where they do not directly
require ‘forwarders’ – as e.g. for single-hop web proxies like the Anonymizer proto-
col [3] – they rely on the obfuscation of network traffic provided by the activity of a
(large) set of users. The number of users who forward requests or join in the infras-
tructure determines the anonymity degree of the systems. A point in case is the Tor
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protocol [9]. Although Tor has built a significant community of volunteer forwarders,
if at any time the user-to-relay ratio becomes too small, then all users will be affected,
and will receive a lower-security service [23].
To address these problems, researchers in anonymity networks have considered
mechanisms to incentivise cooperation [23, 16]. The ‘gold star’ mechanism in Tor [23]
encourages users to act as cooperative relays, by enhancing the service performance for
well-behaved forwarders. Indeed, relays which provide a good service to other users
get the gold-star reward, and messages sent by gold-star holders are given higher relay
priority, i.e. they are always relayed ahead of other traffic. Tor’s management algo-
rithms routinely scans existing directory authorities to actively measure each user’ per-
formance, and only grant the gold star where appropriate. Users of BRAIDS [16] anony-
mously ‘pay’ Tor relays with generic tickets according to the three hierarchical service
classes. This allows the users to earn credits which they can redeem against improved
traffic performance in Tor. Some mechanisms were proposed to encourage peers to act
cooperatively in P2P systems. These include, e.g., payment schemes, which charge for
anonymity services and/or reward good user behaviour; and reputation schemes, where
users with higher reputation get higher-quality service. PAR [2] and XPay [7] are pay-
ment mechanisms: they produce monetary incentives by using e-cash and an online
bank. Reputation schemes [8, 27, 29] use interaction histories to develop trust levels
for members in the systems; this encourages trustworthy behaviour and incentives fu-
ture cooperative behaviours. Some reputation schemes are however incompatible with
anonymity systems, as relays cannot always link interactions to users.
In this paper wemodel user behaviours in the anonymity systems as non-cooperative
games. In the context of network security, game-theoretic models have primarily been
used to address problems related to free-riding in P2P systems [18] and distributed in-
trusion detection [5, 17, 26]. In [18], game theory has been used to characterise peer
selfishness and provide incentives for peers to contribute their upload capacities. The
work closest to ours is [1], where the authors study incentive systems for four types
of users and in doing so lay the foundations for a game-theory approach to modelling
anonymity infrastructures. Their model is based on mix-nets [6]. Although quite gen-
eral, such model cannot accommodate the evaluation of specialised utility functions in
the context of specific anonymity protocols. Each player in loc. cit. belongs to one of
only four types (viz., user, honest node, dishonest node and sender), and in each type all
players behave uniformly. Finally, [1] assume that traffic is distributed uniformly across
nodes, which clearly may not be a realistic assumption: e.g., in reputation-based net-
works users are obviously more likely to ask relays with high reputation as forwarders
for the messages. In such cases, the anonymity degree differ for each user [25].
7 Conclusion
The effectiveness of anonymity networks depends heavily on the number of coopera-
tive users. In this paper, we investigated the incentives for users to behave cooperative
or selfish in such networks. We proposed a game theoretic framework and used it to
analyse users’ behaviours and also predict what strategies users will choose under dif-
ferent circumstances and according to their exact balance of preferences among factors
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such as anonymity, performance (message delivery time) and cost. To allow to trade-
off against each others quantities as different as cost (measured in, say, dollars) and
anonymity (measured in the interval [0,1]), the model uses multiplicative parameters
(viz., a and c) to map them to a common or standard scale. Significantly, we also used
the model to assess the effectiveness of the gold-star incentive mechanism.
We studied the phenomenon that in the original C protocol users have little
incentive to act cooperatively beyond the minimum required to remain probabilistically
anonymous, as cooperation incurs a cost which reflects in the user suffering a utility
loss. We then investigated the effectiveness of gold-star mechanism when implemented
in C. We showed that the gold-star mechanism does create incentives for users to
cooperate exactly when the performance incentives cover the cost of forwarding other
users’ messages. Depending on the amount of performance incentives, users will be
willing to be cooperative all the time, or they will choose the Nash equilibrium mixed
strategy, which gains them maximum utility. We observed that the mechanism can be-
come de-anonymising when there are not enough gold-star users, as gold-star messages
then carry a strong clue about their originators. To factor this in, our analysis used an
anonymity measure which takes into account the attackers’ extra knowledge, i.e., the
a priori knowledge they may acquire besides the protocol. In order for the mechanism
to remain effective, the system must therefore enforce a minimum number of gold-star
users in the system, and relax the condition for obtaining gold-star status when the
threshold is not met. Observe that although the gold-star mechanism was conceived for
Tor, in order to keep the paper self-contained, here we have formulated its concepts and
mechanisms on C. We expect no major difficulties to translate the present results
back to Tor, by applying our game model to the relays, which in fact are the entities the
gold-star mechanism was designed for. Also, he plan to validate our model of Tor by
comparing the predictions made through it with existing results in the literature (viz.,
the simulations in the original gold-star paper [23]). We believe that by restricting to re-
lays, we can apply the game-theoretic framework to Tor, and the performance analysis
can be translated back.We are currently working on mixed anonymity/performance/cost
utilities in Tor, which appears to be more complex.
A cost model alternative to bandwidth is a relay’s liability for the traffic emerging
from it. This generates interesting issues. For instance it may create a deficit of exit
nodes, as relay do not drop messages to save bandwidth, but keep relaying them to avoid
liability for their delivery. This is tantamount to a user fiddling with the forwarding
parameter p f , and goes beyond the cooperative vs selfish choice. Our investigation in
this paper focused on the cooperative/selfish forwarding behaviours in C, where
p f is fixed and equal for all users. We leave the study of the important liability payoff
for future work.
Modelling performance payoffs is useful in real-world scenarios, in that it allows
researchers to make good and useable predictions with no or only minor resort to sim-
ulations. We believe that this is a significant contribution, as simulations can be taxing
in terms of computational power as well as time.
Differently from previous work, our utility functions are not limited to anonymity
aspects, but are composed of independently-configurable factors which allow us to
model different types of users as well as adapt the model to specific applications. This
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adds a good deal of flexibility to our game model. In particular, it makes the model more
suitable for asymmetric anonymity systems, i.e., systems where users differ from each
other by means of different payoffs and utility functions. Also, we employ our model
to study the Nash strategies and dominant strategies for users in the game. We are not
aware of previous work in this line.
In future work, we plan to refine the model and, more specifically, adapt the tech-
niques presented here to cooperative games in the presence of irrational players and
more complex utilities. This will allow us to take into account more kinds of attack,
and model the fact that attacks targeted to specific users may definitely affect their util-
ities. For instance, a ‘denial-of-service’ attack will impact adversely the effectiveness
of reputation-based incentive mechanisms, whilst the gold-star scheme will suffer from
‘intersection attacks’ on anonymity. We also plan to compare different anonymity sys-
tems, such as, C, onion routing, Mix-net in our model, to study which incentive
schemes are better suited to each of them.
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